Behind the Veil: Mysticism and the Reply to Hiddenness in the Work of Travis Dumsday by McCrary, Catherine
Quaerens Deum: The Liberty
Undergraduate Journal for
Philosophy of Religion
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 3
January 2017
Behind the Veil: Mysticism and the Reply to
Hiddenness in the Work of Travis Dumsday
Catherine McCrary
Liberty University, catherinejmccrary@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lujpr
Part of the Philosophy Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of
Religion Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Liberty University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Quaerens Deum:
The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@Liberty University. For more information,
please contact scholarlycommunication@liberty.edu.
Recommended Citation
McCrary, Catherine (2017) "Behind the Veil: Mysticism and the Reply to Hiddenness in the Work of Travis Dumsday," Quaerens
Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lujpr/vol3/iss1/3
McCrary 1 
 
Quaerens Deum  Spring 2017     Volume 3     Issue 1 
 
Behind the Veil: Mysticism and the Reply to 
Hiddenness in the Work of Travis Dumsday 
Catherine McCrary 
     Like the Problem of Evil, God’s hiddenness is a difficult subject, not only from 
a philosophical standpoint, but from a personal, emotional standpoint as well. We 
pose these questions to a silent God like an abandoned child questions an absent 
father: With a mixture of both sadness and anger, and the confusion of a childlike 
mind that cannot hope to understand. “Why did you leave us?” “Why have you 
allowed so much evil to befall us?” “Why won’t you help us?” “Why do you hide 
from us?” These questions weigh heavy on the human heart, and their answers carry 
enormous import; it is critical that we answer accordingly. I have opted to approach 
the subject of God’s hiddenness from the perspective of religious experience and 
the mystic tradition. I will argue parallel to Travis Dumsday that (1) God’s 
hiddenness is actually necessary when we consider the nature of religious 
experience, (2) instantaneous, indubitable knowledge of God (brought about via 
religious experience) may do more damage than good, and (3) the monastic 
tradition adequately testifies to God’s “visibility.” In this paper, I will expand upon 
the groundwork that Dumsday has laid. I will argue that the mystic tradition in 
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particular exemplifies both Dumsday’s points about religious experience and 
monasticism, while also binding the spokes of his argument together more securely. 
     It is important first that we lay out the parameters of the hiddenness argument 
and Travis Dumsday’s responses to it. The hiddenness argument has steadily grown 
in popularity and is now just behind the Problem of Evil in popularity with atheists. 
One reason (perhaps the reason) for its popularity is that, like the Problem of Evil, 
it is notoriously difficult to answer. Its basic structure has not changed much over 
the years, but much of the recent literature deals with J. L. Schellenberg’s 
formulation of the argument:  
(1) Necessarily, if God exists, anyone who is (i) not resisting God and 
(ii) capable of meaningful conscious relationship with God is also 
(iii) in a position to participate in such relationship (able to do so 
just by trying). 
(2) Necessarily, one is, at a time, in a position to participate in a 
meaningful conscious relationship with God only if at that time one 
believes that God exists. 
(3) Necessarily, if God exists, anyone who is (i) not resisting God and 
(ii) capable of meaningful conscious relationship with God also (iii) 
believes that God exists. 
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(4) There are (and often have been) people who are (i) not resisting God 
and (ii) capable of meaningful conscious relationship with God 
without also (iii) believing that God exists. 
And from the conjunction of (3) and (4) it clearly follows that  
(5) God does not exist.1 
A loving God who wants the best for us and desires a relationship with us, 
Schellenberg argues, would assure that anyone who is not actively resisting Him 
will at least have access to knowledge of Him and be able to commune with Him 
“just by willing it.”2 After all, trust is the foundation of all relationships, and how 
could we possibly form a relationship with God if we cannot be certain He exists, 
nor commune with Him without significant effort (especially when this effort does 
not even ensure success)? This creates the problem of “nonresistant 
nonbelievers”—people who are not actively resisting belief in God, yet do not 
believe in Him. How could God allow such people to exist if He wants the best for 
all of us, and our best is a personal relationship with Him? Much like the Problem 
of Evil, the hiddenness argument seems nigh impenetrable, but there is one 
                                                          
1 Travis Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the Opiate of the People,” International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76, no. 2 (Oct. 2014): 194. 
 
2 Ibid. Many theologians would affirm that relationship with God is what is best for us. 
God’s love for us—if genuine and, therefore, desiring of our well-being—requires relationship 
with us. 
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opportunity for rebuttal. Just as in a theodicy, the theist who seeks to respond to the 
hiddenness argument can escape Schellenberg’s conclusion by providing a reason 
for God’s hiddenness, Plantinga’s fabled proposition r that reconciles seemingly 
inconsistent propositions p (“God exists”) and q (“Evil exists”).3 Many such 
reasons have been put forward by theists seeking to resolve the problem of 
hiddenness, but in this paper, I will be focusing on the answers offered by Travis 
Dumsday.  
     Dumsday has written extensively on the topic of hiddenness, offering several 
reasons why God might have chosen to hide Himself. However, none of these 
reasons offered by Dumsday (or any of those offered by his peers for that matter) 
have proved convincing. I believe that those attempting to answer the problem of 
hiddenness are plagued by the same problem that haunted the great apologists of 
yore who sought to prove God’s existence using the ontological, cosmological, and 
teleological arguments for God’s existence: Namely, no one argument was 
sufficient to make a conclusive case. However, when considered all together, the 
classical arguments for God’s existence make a much stronger case cumulatively 
than each does on its own. Similarly, I believe that many of the answers to the 
hiddenness argument offered by theists naturally fit together and can be combined 
into a far more formidable reply to the problem of hiddenness. I will focus on three 
                                                          
3 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 69. 
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such solutions offered by Dumsday in “Divine Hiddenness and the Opiate of the 
People,” “Divine Hiddenness and the One Sheep,” and “Monasticism and the 
Problem of Divine Hiddenness.” But before I attempt to synthesize these 
arguments, I will sketch Dumsday’s reasoning in each of these essays. 
     In “The Opiate,” Dumsday argues that God’s hiddenness is a necessary 
precaution against “the experience of God” being abused as one would abuse a 
powerful narcotic.4 After all, the experience of the Anselmian God has historically 
been a life-altering experience “either of utter sublimity, ineffable wonder, and 
unspeakable delight, or terror, desolation, and unutterable despair,” at least for 
some.5 For Moses, meeting with God for 40 days and nights caused his face to glow 
so brightly he had to conceal it behind a veil; for Theresa of Avila, Francis of Assisi 
and other mystics, communion with God resulted in powerful ecstasies, which have 
been immortalized in art by Caravaggio and Bernini. Should everyone have 
“constant awareness of [God] (or at least a constant availability of such awareness) 
from the moment [she] achieved the age of reason,” there’s no guarantee that people 
would seek communion with God out of love for Him.6 Instead some may come to 
commune with God simply for the pleasure of the experience, thwarting the 
                                                          
4 Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the Opiate of the People,” 193. 
 
5 Ibid., 197. 
 
6 Ex. 34:28-35; Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the Opiate of the People,” 193. 
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possibility of genuine and meaningful relationship with the divine. This creates at 
least two very serious problems right off the bat: (1) Loving and pursuing God for 
such selfish reasons rather than because He is “the concretization of Goodness 
itself, Beauty itself, Love itself” constitutes “a devaluation of God” and a grave sin; 
and (2) using God merely as a means to an end (our own pleasure) makes sincere, 
positive relationship with Him difficult if not impossible, and if one affirms that a 
personal relationship with God is man’s greatest good, then we effectively handicap 
ourselves.7 God would then have at least two good reasons to remain hidden. 
     In “The One Sheep,” Dumsday hones in on the second of the two problems 
presented in “The Opiate” and elaborates it into an argument. In this argument, 
however, he approaches the issue from the perspective of resistant nonbelievers, 
those who actively oppose belief in God. Dumsday argues that Schellenberg’s 
solution to the problem of hiddenness—that a loving God should prevent all or at 
least most nonresistant nonbelief by providing “multiple, powerful religious 
experiences to every person on the planet, beginning from as early an age as 
possible” may do real harm to resistant nonbelievers.8 He gives the example of a 
world in which the vast majority of the world population, say 90%, are not only 
nonresistant to belief in God but are humble, virtuous people and morally mature 
                                                          
7 Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the Opiate of the People,” 197-98. 
 
8 Travis Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the One Sheep,” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 79, no. 1 (Feb. 2016): 76. 
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enough for relationship with the Divine.9 In Schellenberg’s perfect world, this 90% 
would have rationally indubitable knowledge of God from a young age and, being 
properly disposed to do so, would respond properly to this knowledge and enter 
into relationship with God. The remaining 10% of resistant nonbelievers would be 
free to carry on in their unbelief until they reach a state of nonresistance and 
sufficient moral maturity. However, this would result in a minority of unbelievers 
somewhat akin to the Flat Earth Society. In such a world, Dumsday argues, “the 
10% would not be able to ignore or deny theism, any more than the small percentage 
of the population that is born blind could deny the existence of sunlight given the 
overwhelming testimony of those who experience it (even if the blind do not fully 
understand the nature of that to which they are assenting).”10 It would seem that in 
such a world people would be forced into theism before they are ready, potentially 
resulting in harms to the individual’s long-term wellbeing or, perhaps even worse, 
an outright rejection of God even when faced with the undeniable certainty of His 
existence. Thus, God would seem to have another plausible reason for remaining 
hidden: to protect the long-term wellbeing of the resistant. 
                                                          
9 Thomas V. Morris and Daniel Howard-Snyder have both argued elsewhere (Making 
Sense of it All and “The Argument from Divine Hiddenness,” respectively) that it is insufficient 
that one be merely nonresistant to belief in God. Relationship with God—perhaps even simple 
knowledge of Him—requires humility and the moral maturity to recognize God as God. In many 
cases then, our own moral deficiencies preempt any attempt by God to reveal Himself to us, at 
least via rationally indubitable religious experience.  
 
10 Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the One Sheep,” 79. 
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     Dumsday’s final argument takes an entirely different approach to the problem 
of hiddenness than “The Opiate” or “The One Sheep.” Whereas in the preceding 
articles he argued for a particular answer to the problem, in “Monasticism” 
Dumsday simply denies that Schellenberg’s conclusion, proposition 5, follows 
from propositions 3 and 4. Even without a comprehensive answer to the problem 
of hiddenness, Dumsday argues, the existence of nonresistant nonbelievers still 
does not constitute “definitive evidence for atheism” under certain circumstances.11 
He goes on to describe these circumstances by drawing an analogy between the 
problem of hiddenness and its troublesome sister, the problem of evil. He asks us 
to imagine a world identical to our own in every way except one: Throughout 
human history on this world, there have existed communities from every corner of 
the earth whose members have been freed from sin and pain. The members of these 
communities believe they serve as a beacon on a hill, a “witness to [God’s] grace 
in the midst of the wider world of pain and suffering,” but they do not purport to 
have a decisive answer to the problem of evil.12 They have no incontrovertible 
theodicy that proves God has a good reason for allowing so much and so many 
varieties of evil, but then again, they do not particularly need one. The point of the 
illustration is that if such communities did exist, they would not need a conclusive 
                                                          
11 Travis Dumsday, “Monasticism and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” Greek 
Orthodox Theological Review 59 (Jan 2014): 130. 
 
12 Ibid., 131. 
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solution to the problem of evil; they are in themselves a sort of answer to the 
problem. They suggest that although we do not have a solution to the problem of 
evil, an answer may still exist and one day be found. Their existence allows the 
theist to continue to affirm belief in an all-good God and to do so on rational 
grounds. Such idyllic communities do not actually exist, but the circumstances 
described do obtain in the context of the problem of hiddenness, Dumsday argues. 
Monastic communities, particularly Eastern Orthodox ones, are just such examples. 
To the monks in these communities, God is not hidden or absent. “Rather,” 
Dumsday writes, “they live in an ever-growing communion with the divine that not 
infrequently manifests itself in powerful religious experiences, in senses of the 
divine presence, or even (so they claim) miraculous occurrences.”13 While they do 
not purport to have the answer to why God hides Himself from the vast majority of 
the world population or why He allows so much nonresistant nonbelief, they 
illustrate the possibility of a real answer to these questions. 
     Each of these articles on its own is not especially persuasive. They each suffer 
from their own serious criticisms, which Dumsday readily recognizes. For example, 
the so-called “opiate reply” seems to assume that an omnipotent and omniscient 
God could not foresee His creatures’ abuse of the experience of Him and the effect 
that would have on our relationship with Him. Surely He could have found a way 
                                                          
13 Dumsday, “Monasticism and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 132.  
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to affect the same results but without hobbling the development of relationship with 
us. For example, Dumsday describes some experiences of God as terrifying; if our 
experience of the divine were more Isaian than Mosaic, the temptation to abuse the 
privilege of constant communion with God would certainly be reduced if not 
eliminated completely. The One Sheep reply, while it might rescue general theism 
from the hiddenness argument (and that’s a big “might”), seems unable to defend 
specifically Christian theism. After all, Christianity is fundamentally exclusivist. 
Christian soteriology demands belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ, and without 
faith in Him, even the most virtuous among us could not escape damnation. Simple 
knowledge of God’s existence would not be enough to save Dumsday’s mythical 
90%; though they all may believe in God—the same God even—it would seem 
naïve to imagine that all or even most of that 90% would agree that Jesus was God. 
As for the monasticism argument, Dumsday seems to sink his own ship 
immediately out of port. He explicitly acknowledges that “a hardline atheist might 
dismiss the significance of these communities,” and even if the atheist were to 
accept monastic communities as evidence of the rationality of theistic belief, he 
must then square with the patently nontheistic content of religious experiences in, 
say, Zen Buddhist monasticism.14 These and several other consequential criticisms 
(which in the interest of space I must omit here) render these arguments thoroughly 
                                                          
14 Dumsday, “Monasticism and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 131. 
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unconvincing in their current format. However, I do not believe this renders them 
useless. Dumsday’s arguments touch upon several important moving parts within 
this problem, including subjective experience of the Divine and the rationality of 
theistic belief, and it is these insights of his that I believe will be instrumental in 
constructing a more robust answer to the problem of hiddenness. 
     If Dumsday’s three arguments are spokes, I believe we can remake the wheel by 
placing mysticism at the hub. Carl McColman, noted author and lay member of a 
contemplative Christian community himself, offers several “snappy definitions” of 
mysticism while still emphasizing its basic ineffability: “Mysticism is the art of 
union with God. Mysticism is the experiential core of spirituality. . .. Mysticism is 
the heart of spirituality where all religious differences are resolved and we find 
unity in the sacred.”15 Mysticism draws together and unifies Dumsday’s most 
salient points about monasticism and the subjective, euphoric nature of religious 
experience, while importing a more instructive, more mystic notion of God 
otherwise absent from the discussion. The debate over hiddenness can be criticized 
on the grounds that it operates upon a highly anthropomorphic conception of the 
divine. This is latent in the language of “hiding” and “revealing” that dominates the 
                                                          
15 Carl McColman, The Big Book of Christian Mysticism: The Essential Guide to 
Contemplative Spirituality (Charlottesville: Hampton Roads Publishing Company, 2010), 28. 
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hiddenness debate.16 But this “peekaboo” notion of God is foreign to those in the 
mystical tradition. Dumsday himself references this fact himself in “Monasticism” 
when he writes of those in the Eastern Orthodox tradition:  
Imagine the modern philosopher presenting the problem of divine 
hiddenness to a sixteenth-century Ukrainian peasant. What would the 
latter’s reaction be? Perhaps something along the following lines: “What do 
you mean God is ‘hidden’? He’s not hidden to the monks and holy elders. 
If you want to learn more, go to the monastery. Why does God not just 
reveal himself to everyone? 1 don’t know. Ask the monks. And if they don’t 
know, at least we have their witness to the fact that God is active in the 
world, not ‘hidden’ as you suggest.”17 
Even those laypeople to whom God is effectively hidden (i.e. they do not possess 
indubitable belief in his existence nor have they had a religious experience) may 
not perceive Him as hidden. This is because mysticism emphasizes both God’s 
omnipresence and His mystery. God is a spirit and as such He is not “absent” from 
or “present” in spaces as we are; as King David wrote “Where can I go from your 
                                                          
16 In the interest of fairness, it is the hiddenness debate. It would seem at least difficult, if 
not impossible, to meaningfully interact with the topic while avoiding using anthropomorphic 
language. This criticism is perhaps best understood then as a call to recognize this tendency within 
the debate rather than as a call to fundamentally alter the language of the debate. 
 
17 Dumsday, “Monasticism and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness,” 134. 
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Spirit? Where can I flee from your presence?”18 At the same time, noted 
philosopher and theologian Rudolf Otto calls this omnipresent being, or rather, the 
experience of it, the mysterium tremendum et fascinans—the fascinating mystery 
before which we tremble. God belongs to the realm of the numinous; He is entirely 
other, an unknowable mystery that captivates our imaginations, yet there is an 
“awefulness, overpoweringness, and energy” in the experience of Him that causes 
us to tremble in His presence.19 “The daemonic-divine object may appear to the 
mind an object of horror and dread,” Otto writes, “but at the same time it is no less 
something that allures with a potent charm. . .. The ‘mystery’ is for [man] not 
merely something to be wondered at but something that entrances him.”20  
     It is no wonder then that Dumsday’s Ukrainian peasant would be so easily 
satisfied by the testimony of priests. The mystic tradition affirms what Dumsday 
and Thomas Morris suggest: that there is a requisite level of moral capacity needed 
in addition to simple nonresistance in order for someone to experience God. If the 
experience of the majestic and terrifying mystery that is God was too great for 
Moses, Francis of Assisi, and Theresa of Avila, among others, what reason do we 
                                                          
18 Ps. 139:7 NIV. 
 
19 Sumner B. Twiss and Walter H. Conser, Jr., eds., Experience of the Sacred: Readings 
in the Phenomenology of Religion (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992), 78-79. 
 
20 Rudolf Otto, “On Numinous Experience as Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinans,” in 
Experience of the Sacred: Readings in the Phenomenology of Religion, eds. Sumner B. Twiss and 
Walter H. Conser, Jr. (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1992), 85. 
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have to think that such an experience would be wonderful for a nonresistant 
nonbeliever in South Asia who has never heard the name of Christ? In fact, as far 
as Christianity goes, Schellenberg’s prescription for what a truly good God would 
do to reveal Himself to His creation, does not seem especially helpful if these 
people still do not affirm the divinity of Jesus Christ. In this way Dumsday’s one 
sheep reply, and his argument against hiddenness as a whole, would seem unable 
to escape the criticism that it cannot defend specifically Christian theism. However, 
this is a bullet I am willing to bite, and not an especially damaging one as far as I 
am concerned. In this way, I believe we can still affirm the importance of 
evangelism and missionary work while also maintaining that God is not hidden in 
the sense that Schellenberg seems to believe. God, like a mystery, is impenetrable, 
“hidden” by definition, and He must be so if He is indeed the sort of maximal being 
that St. Anselm imagined Him to be (else we should all burn away like mist in His 
presence). This does not mean that God is completely inaccessible. Even as we 
stand transfixed by the mysterium tremendum et fascinans, God races down to grasp 
our feebly outstretched hands.  
     This gives us some room to maneuver when it comes to the topic of non-theistic 
religious experiences as in Zen or (non-dualistic) Hindu monastic traditions. The 
issue at hand is not that there exist monastic communities where the members doubt 
the existence of God. That simply reinforces what we already know: God remains 
hidden to most people, even those who are in search of the divine. What is at issue 
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here is the idea that there might be non-theistic religious experiences. If this is the 
case, it casts doubt upon the value of theistic religious experiences, specifically 
their value as evidence for God’s existence (or more modestly, the reasonability of 
belief in God). Orthodox Christianity has suggested that there may perhaps be more 
than one variety of religious experience, some being less theistic and, therefore, 
less veridical than others. But even if one were to reject this patently Christian 
explanation based largely on Orthodox tradition, I believe there is still an answer 
open to the theist. However, this requires us to turn to metaphysics. Without 
becoming too bogged down in a discussion of the metaphysics undergirding the 
phenomenology of religious experience, I believe the metaphysical implications of 
non-theistic religious experiences basically comport with theism, and mysticism as 
a whole seems to affirm this. Mystic experiences do not fundamentally differ 
although their content may change depending upon the specific tradition, whether 
that be Sufism, Vedanta Hinduism, or Kabbalah Judaism. McColman affirms this 
himself when he writes, “Mysticism is a manifestation of something, which is at 
the root of all religion, and all the higher religions have their mystical 
expressions.”21 McColman’s fellow mystic, Swami Abhayananda, echoes this 
sentiment:  
                                                          
21 McColman, The Big Book of Christian Mysticism, 30. 
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Scholars may imagine that a Buddhist experiences one thing, a Vedantist 
another, and so forth; but one who has experienced It, whether a Sufi, 
Christian or Hindu, knows that It is the final Truth, the only One. There are 
not different [Unities] one for each sect or denomination; there is only one 
One, and it is That which is experienced by Christians, Buddhists, Hindus 
and Sufis alike.22 
Although one may indeed be a Zen Buddhist monk and an atheist (or at least an 
agnostic), the Zen Buddhist’s non-theistic experience of what Abhayananda calls 
“Unity” does not diminish the Christian mystic’s theistic experience of that same 
Unity. She simply makes sense of the ineffable in a different way. 
     The mystic traditions of religions all around the world testify against the 
problem of hiddenness, and by tapping into their unique, mystical conception of 
God, the replies to the hiddenness problem offered by Travis Dumsday can be 
synthesized into a far more comprehensive reply. The both terrifying and 
fascinating, omnipresent and numinous God of mysticism is indeed “hidden” from 
us, but perhaps not in the way that the anthropomorphic language permeating the 
hiddenness debate might suggest. He is accessible to those willing to devote 
themselves to a life of careful cultivation of virtue and moral living, and even to 
                                                          
22 Swami Abhayananda, History of Mysticism: The Unchanging Testament (ATMA 
books, 2012), 242-43. 
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those, the experience of Him is overwhelming, both irresistible and existentially, 
unutterably terrifying. A truly loving relationship is one entered in through the free 
will of the beloved, and God does not force Himself, even indirectly, upon 
nonbelievers. Under this conception of the divine, God remains hidden because of 
the limitations we have imposed upon our relationship with Him.  
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